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Product Design Liability in Oregon
and the New Restatement
regon courts have been in the forefront in developing the
law governing product design liability. From Heaton v.
Ford Motor Co. , decided over three decades ago by the Oregon
Supreme Court, Oregon courts have set a tone of good common
sense and sound theoretical structure in this sometimes confusing
area of the law. A recent opinion by the Court of Appeals in
McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp. 2 provides cause for concern.
* Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. A.B. 1959, Princeton
University; LL.B. 1962, LL.M. 1964, Harvard University.
* Newell DeValpine Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. A.B. 1962, Beth
Medrash Elyon Research Institute; B.S. 1970, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee;
J.D. 1965, Marquette University.
1 435 P.2d 806 (Or. 1967).
2 160 Or. App. 201 (1999). This Article will focus only on the liability theories
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But on the whole, Oregon courts have been leaders in product
liability. Thus, Oregon decisions have traditionally found their
way into the leading torts and products liability casebooks as
classic works that deserve the attention of scholars and students
of the law.3 More importantly, they are cited and relied upon
with great frequency by courts throughout the country.4
From 1992 until 1998, the authors of this article served as co-
reporters for the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liabil-
ity.5 From the beginning, the authors turned to the Oregon deci-
sions for guidance in drafting both the black letter rules and the
official comments.6 It became clear to us that Oregon is a para-
digm state whose traditional law is almost totally congruent with
the Products Liability Restatement. Although Oregon has yet to
formally adopt the new Restatement, it is clear that the new Re-
statement has adopted Oregon law. To be sure, there remain
some terminological differences between the Restatement and
the law as articulated by the Supreme Court of Oregon. But the
differences are, in our view, purely terminological-not
substantive.
This Article first describes the test for design defect adopted
discussed in McCathern. All issues concerning the sufficiency of evidence to estab-
lish liability are beyond the scope of this article.
3 See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 639
(3d ed. 1997) (citing Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978));
DAVID A. FISCHER & WILLIAM POWERS, JR., PRODUCTS LIABILITY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 177 (2d ed. 1994) (citing Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033
(Or. 1974)); JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABIL-
rr: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 462 (3d ed. 1997) (citing Heaton v. Ford Motor Co.,
435 P.2d 806 (Or. 1967)); id. at 540 (citing Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp.); W. PAGE
KEETON, ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY 179 (2d ed. 1989) (citing Hea-
ton v. Ford Motor Co.).
4 Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., and Wilson v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., for example, have been cited and relied upon in many cases by courts
outside of Oregon. See, e.g., Virgil v. "Kash n'Karry" Serv. Corp., 484 A.2d 652, 656
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (citing Heaton); Uder v. Missouri Farmers Ass'n, Inc.,
668 S.W.2d 82, 93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Heaton); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Volk-
swagen of Am., Inc., 502 N.E.2d 651, 655 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (citing Heaton);
Potter v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 578 P.2d 859, 865 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (citing
Heaton); Johnson v. International Harvester Co., 702 F.2d 492, 496 (4th Cir. 1983)
(applying Maryland law) (citing Wilson); Dart v. Wiebe Mfg. Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 881
(Ariz. 1978) (citing Phillips, Wilson); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410,
413 n.1 (Colo. 1986) (citing Wilson); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 432 A.2d
925, 929 (N.J. 1981) (citing Phillips). Moreover, all three cases have been cited 148
times in law reviews and journals.
5 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1998) [hereinafter RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD)].
6 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 2 Reporters' Notes to cmt. d at 60-61.
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by the Products Liability Restatement and explains why the Re-
statement accepts one test and rejects others. It then focuses on
several aspects of the Restatement that, although not discussed
in the McCathern opinion, are clearly an integral part of Oregon
law. Finally, the article examines Oregon case law dealing with
design defect liability. It will become evident that, except for
McCathern itself, almost total congruence exists between the Re-
statement and the Oregon decisions. We suggest, however, that
the clarity of Oregon law would be enhanced if the high court
were to reject what may constitute a departure from tradition in
McCathern and clarify some of the terminology that it uses to
describe what Oregon courts are actually doing.
I
DESIGN DEFECT LIABILITY UNDER THE NEW
PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESTATEMENT
A. Design Cases in Which Independent Design Standards Are
Not Required
Before examining the standards that govern most classic de-
sign cases,7 it is important to identify several classes of cases
where independent standards for defective design are not
required.
1. Products That Fail Their Manifestly Intended Functions:
Drawing An Inference of Defect
When a product fails to perform its manifestly intended func-
tion, one may properly draw an inference of defect without proof
of a specific defect.' For example, when an automobile's steering
7 Classic design cases are those that do not fall within the three classes of cases
governed by the non-controversial rules set forth in this section. Typically these
cases require a manufacturer to make tradeoffs between competing values in order
to decide the appropriate level of safety for any given product. For a comprehensive
discussion of classic design cases, see James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski,
Achieving Consensus on Defective Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 867, 876-
904 (1998) [hereinafter Achieving Consensus].
8 See, e.g., Sanders v. Quikstak, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 128, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
("Under certain circumstances, however, a plaintiff need not prove a specific defect
in the product at issue. Despite an absence of proof of any specific defect in a prod-
uct, a jury may infer that an accident occurred because of a defect when the plaintiff
has proven that the product did not perform as intended and has excluded all causes
of the accident not attributable to the defendant."); Dietz v. Waller, 685 P.2d 744,
745 (Ariz. 1984) ("[N]o specific defect need be shown if the evidence, direct or cir-
cumstantial, permits the inference that the accident was caused by a defect."); Har-
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mechanism fails after several hundred miles of use, one may
properly draw an inference that the product was defective at the
time of sale. 9 It is of no moment whether the product failed be-
cause it had a manufacturing defect or because it was badly
designed. The malfunction of the product "speaks for itself" and
thus obviates the need for a specific standard for defectiveness. 10
This malfunction doctrine is a close analog to the familiar doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur that applies to negligence cases." Just
as one may circumstantially draw an inference of negligence in a
general tort case, one may draw a similar inference of defect in a
products liability case.
The new Restatement recognizes that liability may be estab-
lished utilizing a res ipsa-type inference. Section 3 provides:
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was
rell Motors, Inc. v. Flanery, 612 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Ark. 1981) ("[P]roof of the specific
defect is not required when common experience tells us that the accident would not
have occurred in the absence of a defect."); Mote v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 466
N.E.2d 593, 596 (I11. App. Ct. 1984) (it was reasonable for jury to conclude that there
was an absence of abnormal use and that a ladder failed to perform in the manner
reasonably expected in light of its intended function); Tulgetske v. R.D. Werner Co.,
408 N.E.2d 492, 496 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (plaintiff can make out strict liability claim
by proving that product failed to perform in a manner reasonably expected in light
of its intended function); Landahl v. Chrysler Corp., 534 N.Y.S.2d 245, 246 (App.
Div. 1988) ("[Pllaintiff in a products liability action need not establish the precise
nature of the defect in order to make out a prima facie case.").
9 See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
10 See, e.g., Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 89 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying
Pennsylvania law) (plaintiff need not prove the existence of a specific defect if plain-
tiff can show that the product malfunctioned in the absence of abnormal use and
reasonable secondary causes); Marcus v. Anderson/Gore Homes, Inc., 498 So. 2d
1051, 1052 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) ("When a product malfunctions during normal
operations, a legal inference arises that the product is defective .... ); Farmer v.
International Harvester Co., 553 P.2d 1306, 1312 (Idaho 1976) ("Proof of malfunc-
tion is circumstantial evidence of a defect in a product since a product will not ordi-
narily malfunction within the reasonable contemplation of a consumer in the
absence of defect."); Stackiewicz v. Nissan Motor Corp., 686 P.2d 925, 928 (Nev.
1984) ("[P]roof of an unexpected, dangerous malfunction may suffice to establish a
prima facie case for the plaintiff of the existence of a product defect."); Harkins v.
Calumet Realty Co., 614 A.2d 699, 705 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) ("[Malfunction theory]
permits a plaintiff to prove a defect in a product with evidence of the occurrence of a
malfunction and with evidence eliminating abnormal use or reasonable, secondary
causes .... ).
11 See Welge v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 17 F.3d 209, 211 (7th Cir. 1994) (citation
omitted) ("The doctrine [of res ipsa loquitur] is not strictly applicable to a products
liability case because ... the defendant.., has parted with possession and control of
the harmful object before the accident occurs. But the doctrine merely instantiates
the broader principle, which is as applicable to a products case as to any other tort
case, that an accident can itself be evidence of liability.").
[Vol. 78, 1999]
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caused by a product defect existing at the time of sale or distri-
bution, without proof of a specific defect, when the incident
that harmed the plaintiff:
(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product
defect; and
(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of causes
other than product defect existing at the time of sale ordistribution.r
It should be noted that courts, when imposing liability under
this doctrine, often talk of products failing to meet consumer-
expectations. 13 There is little harm in doing so, as long as one
recognizes that what is truly at work is not a new liability doc-
trine, i.e., the consumer expectations test, but rather a traditional
inference of defect arising from the occurrence of manifest prod-
uct failure.14
2. Noncompliance With a Product Safety Statute or Regulation
When a product design fails to comply with a product safety
statute or regulation, the design is defective per se. 15 One need
not search for an independent standard for design defect. The
statute or regulation provides the minimum safety standard and
failure to comply with that standard subjects the seller to liability
12 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 3.
13 See, e.g., Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140, 1146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
("[Ejvidence of the nature of an accident itself may, under certain circumstances,
give rise to a reasonable inference that the product was defective because the cir-
cumstances of the product's failure may be such as to frustrate the ordinary con-
sumer's expectations of its continued performance."); Doyle v. White Metal Rolling
& Stamping Corp., 618 N.E.2d 909, 916 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) ("(A] plaintiff may cre-
ate an inference that a product was defective by direct or circumstantial evidence
that: (1) there was no abnormal use of the product; (2) ... there was no reasonable
secondary cause of the injury; and (3) ... the product failed to perform in the man-
ner reasonably to be expected in light of its nature and intended function."); Cincin-
nati Ins. Co. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 502 N.E.2d 651, 655 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985)
(In a fire case, "the reasonable expectations of a buyer of a motor vehicle is that the
main electrical cable harness of such vehicle will not start a fire.").
14 The res ipsa inference has a long history in the law of torts and does not rest on
doctrinal ground. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
15 See, e.g., Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 431 (1958) ("[A]
defect resulting from a violation of ... statute which causes the injury or death of an
employee creates liability without regard to negligence."); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v.
Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455, 461 (4th Cir. 1960) ("The majority of American courts which
have passed on this question, in cases arising under state laws resembling the Fed-
eral Act, have held violations [of safety statutes] to be negligence per se."); Wells v.
City of Vancouver, 467 P.2d 292, 295 (Wash. 1970) ("The scope of the duty imposed
by statutory rule is a matter of law.").
OREGON LAW REVIEW
with respect to the risks sought to be reduced by the statute or
regulation. Section 4 of the new Restatement sets forth this well-
accepted rule.1
6
3. Misrepresentations-Specific Assertions of Product
Performance
The tort of misrepresentation allows recovery when a defend-
ant specifically represents that a product will perform in a certain
manner. 17 When the product fails to meet the representation
and, as a result, personal injury or property damage occurs, the
defendant is subject to liability without regard to whether the
product could have been made safer. 18 In effect, the defendant is
required to "put its money where its mouth is." The Restate-
ment of Products Liability recognizes the cause of action for mis-
representation without regard to product defectiveness or fault
on the part of the defendant. Section 9 provides that "[o]ne en-
gaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products
who, in connection with the sale of a product, makes a fraudu-
lent, negligent, or innocent misrepresentation of material fact
concerning the product is subject to liability for harm to persons
or property caused by the misrepresentation."' 9 This section re-
flects the law as stated in Section 402B of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts.2 ° Courts have found that product portrayals or
statements in advertisements may constitute misrepresentations
within the meaning of these sections when they are sufficiently
specific.21 Compared with an action based on defective design,
16 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 4.
17 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 14, § 402B, cmt. g.
18 See, e.g., Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 35 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Wash. 1934) (represen-
tation that windshield was shatterproof constituted a warranty even though no safer
windshield was available).
19 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 9.
20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 14, § 402B.
21 See, e.g., Hauter v. Zogarts, 534 P.2d 377 (Cal. 1975) (statement ("COM-
PLETELY SAFE BALL WILL NOT HIT PLAYER") on cover of instruction book-
let of a golf training device constituted misrepresentation); Huebert v. Federal
Pacific Electric Co., Inc., 494 P.2d 1210, 1214 (Kan. 1972) ("In the highly competi-
tive world of marketing and selling, manufacturers must seek and explore methods
of increasing the sale of their products. One of these methods is the use of many
forms of advertising which may include statements that their products will perform
or not perform in a certain way. If pertinent, the advertising may claim certain
safety features that assure a purchaser that the product will operate in a manner on
which the purchaser can rely and no injury will occur .... These warranties are
express rather than implied."); Klages v. General Ordnance Equip. Corp., 367 A.2d
304 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (statement in promotional literature that mace weapon
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advantages of the misrepresentation action are formidable. First,
as noted, it makes no difference whether the product meets even
the most exacting independent design standards.22 Second, the
requirement of but-for proximate cause disappears. To make out
the tort of misrepresentation, a plaintiff must establish justifiable
reliance as an element of the cause of action. Justifiable reliance
is an element of Section 402B and is incorporated by reference in
the comments to the new Restatement. 23 However, it is not nec-
essary to overcome the hurdle of classic proximate causation to
make out an action for misrepresentation. Thus, if the product
fails to perform according to the representation, liability follows
even if it is indisputable that no other product or alternative de-
sign could have avoided the injury.24 It is important to note that
misrepresentation is not dependent on a finding of product de-
fect but constitutes a totally independent action and thus does
not imply that there is something independently wrong with the
product.25 The product simply does not measure up to the spe-
cific claims of safety made for it.
"rapidly vaporizes on face of assailant effecting instantaneous incapacitation" was a
misrepresentation when intruder, after being sprayed in face, was still able to pursue
and shoot victim); Ladd v. Honda Motor Co., 939 S.W.2d 83 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)
(Portrayals in advertisements that all-terrain vehicles could be operated safely by
children could constitute an innocent misrepresentation under Section 402B of the
Second Restatement. The Ladd case contains an excellent review of authority deal-
ing with the issue of product portrayal and advertisements serving as a predicate for
an action in misrepresentation.).
22 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
23 Section 402B sets forth a more extensive articulation of the tort of product mis-
representation. It includes direct reference to the element of misrepresentation.
Section 9 of the Third Restatement sets forth a very sparse black letter rule. The
comments make clear that it intends to incorporate both the black letter and com-
ments of Section 402B. Thus, Section 9, comment b states: "The rules governing
liability for innocent product misrepresentation are stated in the Restatement, Sec-
ond, of Torts, Section 402B." Section 9, comment c incorporates by reference com-
ments g and j of Section 402B. Comment j of Section 402B deals with justifiable
reliance and states that "[T]he rule here stated applies only where there is justifiable
reliance upon the misrepresentation of the seller, and physical harm results because
of such reliance, and because of the misrepresented fact. It does not apply where
the misrepresentation is not known, or there is indifference to it, and it does not
influence the purchase or subsequent conduct."
24 In a misrepresentation case, once the misrepresentation is established and the
product failed in a manner that would not have happened had the representation
been true, liability is established even if no other product or design would have
avoided the injury. Thus, the but-for question is, in practicality, mooted. See supra
note 23 and accompanying text.
25 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 9.
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B. The Tripartite Test For Defect in the Products
Liability Restatement
Although this article focuses on design defect liability, it is im-
portant to note that the new Restatement differs substantially
from section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in its
approach to product defects generally. Section 402A, written
some thirty-five years ago when products liability law was in its
infancy, does not distinguish among the various forms of defect.2 6
Instead, it proclaims that one who sells a product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer is lia-
ble for physical harm caused by the defect. 27 Experience over
the last three decades reveals that a single, all purpose test for
defect is not adequate to the task.28 Instead, courts recognize
separate tests depending on the nature of the defect.29 Section 2
26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 14, § 402A.
27 Id.
28 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 2, cmt. a. Scholars throughout the
country agree. See, e.g., Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect:
From Negligence (to Warranty) to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV.
593, 599-600 (1980); Keith Miller, Design Defect Litigation in Iowa: The Myths of
Strict Liability, 40 DRAKE L. REV. 465, 471 (1991); David G. Owen, The Moral
Foundations of Product Liability Law: Toward First Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 427, 437, 466-67 (1993); William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon
Strict Products Liability, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 639 (1991); Gary T. Schwartz, Fore-
word: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REV. 435, 460-81 (1979); John
W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 830-
38 (1973); Note, Minnesota Replaces the Restatement Standard with a Negligence
Standard in Design Defect Cases, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 891, 892-96 (1985).
29 See, e.g., Glover v. BIC Corp., 987 F.2d 1410, 1414 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying
Oregon law); Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1194 (Alaska 1992); Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 881-82 (Alaska 1979); Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc.,
709 P.2d 876, 878-79 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443,
454 (Cal. 1978) (recognizing that different liability standards apply depending on
which type of defect is involved); Hunt v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 248 S.E.2d
15, 15-17 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (drawing distinction between design and warning
cases, and latent manufacturing defect cases); Cosse v. Allen-Bradley Co., 601 So. 2d
1349, 1351 (La. 1992); Ziegler v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 539 A.2d 701, 703
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988)); Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 970 (Mass. 1978);
Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 182 (Mich. 1984); Bilotta v. Kelley Co.,
346 N.W.2d 616, 621-22 (Minn. 1984) (holding that strict liability test, which is ap-
propriate for manufacturing defects, is not appropriate for design defects); Phillips v.
Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1035-38 (Or. 1974); Morningstar v. Black and
Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E. 2d 666, 682 (W. Va. 1979). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 9:2800.55-57 (West 1988) (establishing different liability tests for manufacturing
defects, design defects, and failure to warn); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63 (1993) (es-
tablishing different liability tests for manufacturing, design, and failure to warn de-
fects); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.900 (1991); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
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of the new Restatement recognizes three categories of product
defect:
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution,
it contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is
defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings. A
product:
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product de-
parts from its intended design even though all possible care
was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the
product;
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by
the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or
other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of
distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders
the product not reasonably safe;
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warn-
ings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product
could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of rea-
sonable instructions or warnings by the seller or other distrib-
utor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution,
and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the
product not reasonably safe.3 °
Section 2(b) sets forth the test for defect in classic design de-
fect cases not governed by the three rules set forth in the preced-
ing section. How and why Section 2(b) came into being are the
subjects of the ensuing discussions.
C. Risk-Utility Balancing and Consumer Expectations-
Choosing Between a Flexible Standard and Formless Intuition
From the outset of the Restatement project, the reporters
faced a choice between two fundamentally different tests for clas-
sic design defect. A strong majority of American jurisdictions
adopt the risk-utility test for design defect.31 This test is also fa-
§ 82.005 (West 1993) (setting standards for proving a design defect which do not
govern a manufacturing defect).
30 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 2.
31 The case law supporting risk-utility balancing as the standard for design defect
is overwhelming. See, e.g., Townsend v. General Motors Corp., 642 So. 2d 411, 418
(Ala. 1994); General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So. 2d 1176, 1191 (Ala. 1985)
(requiring both a reasonable alternative design and that the "utility of the alterna-
tive design outweighed the utility of the design actually used"); Armentrout v. FMC
Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 182 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) (affirming the trial court's jury in-
struction which stated that "[a] product is unreasonably dangerous because of a de-
fect in its design if it creates a risk of harm to persons which is not outweighed by the
benefits to be achieved from such design"); Mazda Motor Corp. v. Lindahl, 706 A.2d
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526, 535 (Del. 1998) (holding that a reasonable alternative design is necessary to
prove a design defect in a crashworthiness case); Warner Freuhauf Trailer Co. v.
Boston, 654 A.2d 1272, 1276 (D.C. 1995) (holding that "the plaintiff must show the
risks, costs and benefits of the product in question and alternative designs, and that
the magnitude of the danger from the product outweighed the costs of avoiding the
danger" (quoting Hull v. Eaton Corp., 825 F.2d 448, 453-54 (D.C. Cir. 1987)));
Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga. 1994) (stating that the court's
review of case law and treatises "revealed a general consensus regarding the utiliza-
tion in design defect cases of a balancing test whereby the risks inherent in a product
design are weighed against the utility or benefit derived from the product"); Guig-
gey v. Bombardier, 615 A.2d 1169, 1172 (Me. 1992) (determining whether a product
is defectively dangerous by balancing "the danger presented by the product against
its utility"); Ziegler v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 539 A.2d 701, 706 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1988) (finding the risk-utility test "the only appropriate test to be applied in
the instant case because it allows full consideration of the relative merits of a prod-
uct design" (quoting Edward S. Digges, Jr. & John G. Billmyre, Product Liability in
Maryland: Traditional and Emerging Theories of Recovery and Defense, 16 U. BALT.
L. REV. 1, 16 (1986))); Caron v. General Motors Corp., 643 N.E.2d 471, 476 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1994) (noting that jury must engage in a risk-utility analysis in defective
design cases); Holm v. Sponco Mfg., 324 N.W.2d 207, 213 (Minn. 1982) (rejecting the
latent-patent danger rule in design defect cases and substituting a "reasonable care"
balancing test); Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 254 (Miss. 1993)
(noting that a plaintiff may "recover for any injury resulting from" a product if she
can prove that "the utility of the product is outweighed by the danger that the prod-
uct creates"); Rix v. General Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195, 201 (Mont. 1986) (finding
that a jury must engage in risk-utility balancing in design defect cases); Thibault v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 846 (N.H. 1978) (stating that when "weighing
utility and desirability against danger, courts should also consider whether the risk of
danger could have been reduced without significant impact on product effectiveness
and manufacturing cost"); Smith v. Keller Ladder Co., 645 A.2d 1269, 1270 (N.J.
Super Ct. App. Div. 1994) (stating that determining "whether a product has been
defectively designed ordinarily involves a risk-utility analysis"); Green v. General
Motors Corp., 709 A.2d 205, 210 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1998) ("[I]n determining
whether [the product] was defective, a jury must determine the risks and alternatives
that should have been known to the manufacturer, and then assess whether the man-
ufacturer discharged its duty to provide a 'reasonably fit, suitable and safe' vehicle.
To do this, the jury employs a risk-utility analysis."); Lewis v. American Cyanamid
Co., 715 A.2d 967, 980 (N.J. 1998) ("Plaintiffs who assert that the product could have
been designed more safely must prove under a risk-utility analysis the existence of
an alternative design that is both practical and feasible."); Carrel v. Allied Products
Corp., No. 9-94-24, 1995 WL 423388, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. July 11, 1995) (noting that
under the statutory risk-utility test a plaintiff must prove "'that the product design is
in a defective condition because the benefits of the challenged design do not out-
weigh the risks inherent in such design"' (quoting State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Chrysler Corp., 523 N.E.2d 489, 494 n.5 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 677 N.E.2d
795 (Ohio 1997))); Hoyt v. Vitek, Inc., 894 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Or. Ct. App. 1995)
("Whether a product is defectively designed ... is a question ... for the court to
consider by balancing the product's utility against the magnitude of the risk associ-
ated with its use." (citing Roach v. Kononen/Ford Motor Co., 269 Or. 457, 525 P.2d
125 (Or. 1974))); Morningstar v. Black and Decker Mfg., 253 S.E.2d 666, 682-83 (W.
Va. 1979) (testing allegedly defective products by a risk-utility balancing test.).
Some states have enacted statutes requiring a risk-utility balancing approach for
design defect claims. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.56. (West 1997)
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vored by an overwhelming majority of scholars.32 This test,
which has its origins in the Learned Hand test for negligence,33
requires courts to take into account a number of factors in decid-
ing whether a product is defectively designed. Among these fac-
tors are the magnitude and probability of the foreseeable risks of
harm, the instructions and warnings accompanying the product,
(adopting a risk-utility standard and providing that a product is designed unreasona-
bly dangerously if, "at the time the product left its manufacturer's control," a safer,
alternative design for the product existed and the "likelihood that the product's de-
sign would cause the claimant's damage and the gravity of that damage outweighed
the burden on the manufacturer of adopting such alternative design and the adverse
effect, if any, of such alternative design on the utility of the product"); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 11-1-63(b) (Supp. 1997) (providing that a product is not defectively designed
if claimant's harm "was caused by an inherent characteristic of the product which is
a generic aspect of the product that cannot be eliminated without substantially com-
promising the product's usefulness or desirability"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.75(E) (Anderson Supp. 1996) (providing that a product is not defectively
designed if a plaintiff's injury resulted from "an inherent characteristic of the prod-
uct which is a generic aspect of the product that cannot be eliminated without sub-
stantially compromising the product's usefulness or desirability"); TEX. Civ. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 82.005 (West 1997) (providing that plaintiff must prove the
existence of a "safer alternative design" that "would have prevented or significantly
reduced" the claimant's risk of injury "without substantially impairing the product's
utility").
32 See, e.g., WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 149, 644 (4th ed. 1971)
(defining the standard of conduct in negligence as a balancing of "the risk, . . .
probability and extent of the harm, against the value of the interest which the actor
is seeking to protect, and the expedience of the course pursued" and writing that in
the area of design defect a manufacturer's liability appears to be "essentially a mat-
ter of negligence"); David A. Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect,
39 Mo. L. REV. 339, 359 (1974) (arguing that "courts should consider, in light of the
facts of the particular case, the merits of the policies underlying strict liability and
balance [those] considerations against countervailing factors"); W. Page Keeton,
Products Liability-Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 CUMB. L. REV.
293, 313 (1979) (proposing that a product be determined defectively designed "if a
reasonable person would conclude that the magnitude of the danger ... outweighs
the utility of the design"); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, A Positive Eco-
nomic Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J. LEGAL SrUD. 535, 553-54 (1985) (endors-
ing use of risk-utility analysis in design defect cases); David G. Owen, Risk-Utility
Balancing in Design Defect Cases, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 239, 239 (1997)
("Courts and commentators increasingly comprehend that ascertaining design defec-
tiveness in products liability cases requires some kind of risk-utility balancing.");
Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REV. 435,
464 (1979) ("There can be little doubt about the correctness of the risk-benefit stan-
dard for design defect .... ); Victor E. Schwartz, The Uniform Products Liability
Act-A Brief Overview, 33 VAND. L. REV. 579, 586 (1980) (writing that the Uniform
Product Liability Act has adopted a standard for design defect cases that "balances
risk against utility"); John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Prod-
ucts, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973) (listing factors to be balanced in a risk-utility
analysis).
33 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
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and the nature and strength of consumer expectations regarding
the product. Factors such as the effects of the product design on
product longevity, maintenance, repair, and aesthetics, together
with the range of consumer choice among products, may also be
taken into account in deciding whether the product violates risk-
utility norms.34
A small cadre of courts35 and scholars36 favor a test for defects
that would allow recovery based on the disappointment of con-
sumer expectations regarding safe product performance. The re-
porters and the American Law Institute rejected the consumer
expectations test as an independent test for design defect in clas-
sic design cases.3 7 Mere intuition, whether based on product ap-
pearance, general advertising, puffing, or simply consumer belief
that a product will perform safely, does not support a finding of
design defect in classic design cases. The reasons for rejecting an
intuitional test are many. First, this hopelessly open-ended and
vague test for defect cannot serve as a guide to manufacturers,
nor can it be fairly administered by the courts.38 Second, if one
34 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 2 cmt. f.
35 See, e.g., French v. Grove Mfg. Co., 656 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1981) (applying Ar-
kansas law); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Ontai v.
Straub Clinic & Hosp. Inc., 659 P.2d 734 (Haw. 1983); Kudlacek v. Fiat, 509 N.W.2d
603 (Neb. 1994); Lee v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 688 P.2d 1283, 1285 (Okla. 1984)
("Plaintiffs... must prove.., that the defect made the product unreasonably dan-
gerous as defined by ordinary consumer expectations."); Sunicht v. Toyota Motor
Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 360 N.W.2d 2, 16-17 (Wis. 1984).36 See, e.g., Howard C. Klemme, Comments to the Reporters and Selected Mem-
bers of the Consultative Group, Restatement of Torts (Third): Products Liability, 61
TENN. L. REV. 1173 (1994); Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products
Liability: The ALI Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631 (1995); Frank J.
Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b): The Rea-
sonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1407 (1994).
The authors responded to the critics in Achieving Consensus, supra note 7, at 911-
19.
37 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 2 cmt. g.
38 Professors Prosser and Keeton make this point about the consumer expecta-
tions test:
The meaning is ambiguous and the test is very difficult of application to
discrete problems. What does the reasonable purchaser contemplate? In
one sense, he does not "expect" to be adversely affected by a risk or hazard
unknown to him. In another sense, he does contemplate the "possibility"
of unknown "side effects." In a sense the ordinary purchaser cannot rea-
sonably expect anything more than that reasonable care in the exercise of
the skill and knowledge available to design engineers has been exercised.
The test can be utilized to explain most any result that a court or jury
chooses to reach. The application of such a vague concept in many situa-
tions does not provide much guidance for a jury.
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successfully attacks a product design as defective, a manufacturer
seeking to avoid liability in the future presumably will redesign
the product. Frequently, when a product is redesigned to elimi-
nate the original risks, other risks of equal or perhaps even
greater magnitude are introduced into the product. If consumer
expectations based on a jury's intuition are to serve as a predi-
cate for liability in classic design cases, then consumers injured
by either of the designs can, with some justification, argue that
their expectations were disappointed.39 A manufacturer would
thus be whipsawed. Anything short of an elaborate explanation
of countervailing risks in its advertisements would lead to liabil-
ity. Finally, as we have explained elsewhere, when a product is
found to disappoint consumer expectations, the but-for proxi-
mate causation issue is predetermined by a finding of defect.4 °
By definition, a product that fails consumer expectations is the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's harm.41 If consumer expecta-
tions are allowed to serve as an acceptable test for defect, a man-
ufacturer is shorn not only of a structured test for defect, but also
of any defense that the alleged defect did not proximately cause
the plaintiff's harm. Where the expectations are vague, the ab-
sence of causation as an element of the action presents to the
courts a cause of action that is wholly without substance. Under
such a regime, no proof of any rigor whatsoever is necessary to
make out a case for defective design.42
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, at 699 (W.
Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984). See also Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In
Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1217, 1236 (1993).
39 See Achieving Consensus, supra note 7, at 880.
4 0 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Intuition and Technology in
Product Design Litigation: An Essay on Proximate Causation, 88 GEO. L.J. (forth-
coming Feb. 2000).
41 Id. The authors argue that the logic supporting the proposition that in a con-
sumer expectations test there is no but-for proximate cause question is irrefutable:
The consumer expectations test asks the jury to determine whether a rea-
sonable consumer would have expected to be harmed in the same manner
in which the plaintiff was harmed when using the product in the manner
that caused the plaintiff's harm. Once the jury decides that the product is
defective because it allowed the plaintiff to suffer a harm that a reasonable
consumer would not have expected, the jury has also automatically decided
that, if the product had not been defective, the harm to plaintiff would not
have resulted. Under consumer expectations, a finding of design defect
automatically predetermines the issue of proximate causation. (footnote
omitted).
Id.
42 See, e.g., id.
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It is worth emphasizing that, even under a risk-utility analysis,
consumer expectations may have some bearing on the issue of
whether a product is reasonably designed or whether a reason-
able alternative design should have been adopted.43 Manufactur-
ers owe a duty to reasonably foresee how their products will be
put to use in the real world. Consumer expectations and percep-
tions of product safety provide important data regarding the
levels of risk that inhere in product use and whether, given that
level of risk, design alternatives should have been adopted. The
Restatement is clear on this point." It does, however, unequivo-
cally reject consumer expectations as a stand-alone test for de-
fects in classic design cases.45
D. Risk-Utility Balancing: Why All Roads Lead to Reasonable
Alternative Design
Once a court is committed to risk-utility balancing in classic
product design cases, logic dictates that a plaintiff must prove
that a reasonable alternative design could have been adopted. In
balancing the advantages and disadvantages of a product, a court
has two choices: (1) it can conclude that the product as designed
was defective because a reasonably safer alternative was avail-
able; or (2) it can decide that, given the overall risks and benefits
of the product, it should not be marketed at all even though the
risks attendant to its use have been fully warned against and no
reasonable alternative is available.
1. Reasonable Alternative Design and the General Rejection of
Product Category Liability
In the overwhelming majority of products liability cases alleg-
ing defective design, courts reject out of hand the notion that the
product in question should not have been marketed at all.46 It
would be strange, indeed, for a court to conclude that unavoid-
ably dangerous products such as minivans, 47 above-ground swim-
43 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 2 cmt. g.
44Id.
45 Id.
46 See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American
Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1263, 1314-1315 (1991) [hereinafter Closing the American Products Liability
Frontier].
47 Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974) (applying
Virginia law).
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ming pools,48 alcoholic beverages,49 consumer power tools for
do-it-yourselfers, 50 handguns 5 1 or motorcycles 52 present greater
risks than benefits to society and should be declared defective
per se. All of these products inherently involve serious dangers
related to their use. They kill and maim with predictable fre-
quency. However, with rare exception, when importuned to use
macro risk-utility balancing to declare that certain product cate-
gories are defective, courts have refused to do so. 3 Whether or
not such products should be marketed is better left to the market
or to governmental regulators. We have argued in several arti-
cles that the courts' refusal to enter this thicket is based on a
judgment that decisions of this magnitude are simply beyond the
institutional capabilities of the adjudicative process. 54 Further-
more, courts are painfully aware that reliable data supporting is-
sues such as the overall pleasures and benefits to society from
use of such products are, and will remain, unavailable. 55
48 See, e.g., O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983) (above-ground
swimming pool with vinyl bottom may be defective even though no alternative de-
sign was feasible). This decision was effectively overturned by statute. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:58C-3a(1) (West 1987).
49 See, e.g., McGuire v. Joseph Seagram & Sons, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 842, 852 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1990) (requiring warning since alcohol is dangerous beyond the contempla-
tion of ordinary consumers), rev'd, 814 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1991). For explanation as
to why the intermediate appellate court's decision was, in truth, an attempt to de-
clare alcohol as defective per se, see Closing the American Products Liability Fron-
tier, supra note 46, at 1324-25.
50 See, e.g., Falls v. Scott, 815 P.2d 1104, 1109 (Kan. 1991) (holding that machine
designed to cut brush, small trees, or high weeds and grass was not defective per se).
51 See, e.g., Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532, 1533-34 (11th Cir.
1986) (applying Florida law); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1268 (5th Cir.
1985) (applying Louisiana law), reh'g denied sub nom. Richman v. Charter Arms
Corp., 768 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1985); Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 773
(D.N.M. 1987), affd, 843 F.2d 406, 407 (10th Cir. 1988) (applying New Mexico law);
Hilberg ex rel. Hilberg v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 761 P.2d 236, 240 (Colo. Ct. App.
1988), overruled on other grounds by Casebolt v. Cowan, 829 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1992);
Riordan v. Int'l Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1298-99 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985);
Knott v. Liberty Jewelry and Loan, Inc., 748 P.2d 661, 663 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
See also McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 151 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that talon
bullets are not defective per se).
52 For an argument that motorcycles might indeed be defective per se because
they fail the risk-utility test, see Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Strug-
gle at the Center of Products Liability, 60 Mo. L. REV. 1, 30-34 (1995).
53 See generally Achieving Consensus, supra note 7, at 884-87; Closing the Ameri-
can Products Liability Frontier, supra note 46.
54 See Closing the Products Liability Frontier, supra note 46, at 1300-06; Achieving
Consensus, supra note 7, at 884-87.
55 See Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 731 F. Supp. 50, 53 (D. Mass. 1990), affd,
926 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1990); Patterson v. Rohm Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206,
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With the rejection of category liability, the only question that
faces a court in a design defect case is whether the product could,
and should, have been made safer. This, of course, raises the
question of whether the manufacturer should have adopted a
reasonable alternative design.
2. The Possibility of Manifestly Unreasonable Designs
Notwithstanding judicial rejection of the sort of categorical lia-
bility just considered, several courts have suggested, in dicta, that
some product categories have such low utility and such high risk
potential that they should be declared categorically defective
even if no reasonable alternative design is available.56 Although
there are no actual holdings to that effect, it is clear that some
courts wish to retain the future option of finding that, in extreme
circumstances, an entire product category may be defective per
se.57 The Restatement recognizes this possibility in § 2, comment
e. This comment sets forth the conditions for the possible appli-
cation of category liability:
e. Design defects: possibility of manifestly unreasonable de-
sign. Several courts have suggested that the designs of some
products are so manifestly unreasonable, in that they have low
social utility and high degree of danger, that liability should
attach even absent proof of how the range of relevant alterna-
tive designs are described. For example, a toy gun that shoots
hard rubber pellets with sufficient velocity to cause injury to
children could be found to be defectively designed within the
rule of Subsection (b). Toy guns unlikely to cause injury
1210 (N.D. Tex. 1985); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp, 463 A.2d 298, 314 (N.J. 1993)
(Schrieber, J., dissenting).
56 See Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978).
There might be cases in which the jury would be permitted to hold the
defendant liable on account of a dangerous design feature even though no
safer design was feasible (or there was no evidence of a safer practicable
alternative). If, for example, the danger was relatively severe and the prod-
uct had only limited utility, the court might properly conclude that the jury
could find that a reasonable manufacturer would not have introduced such
a product into the stream of commerce.
Id. at 1328 n.5. See also, e.g., Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 185 n.8
(Colo. 1992) (en banc); Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92, 97 n.8 (Minn.
1987) ("Conceivably, rare cases may exist where the product may be judged unrea-
sonably dangerous because it should be removed from the market rather than be
redesigned .... "); Rix v. General Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195, 201 (Mont. 1986). See
also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3(b) (West 1987).
57 The lack of actual holdings and the tentative nature of the courts' suggestions
that liability might be imposed in such circumstances indicates that courts simply
wish to retain the judicial prerogative of imposing liability in the future.
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would constitute reasonable alternatives to the dangerous toy.
Thus, toy guns that project ping-pong balls, soft gelatin pellets,
or water might be found to be reasonable alternative designs
to a toy gun that shoots hard pellets. However, if the realism
of the hard pellet gun, and thus its capacity to cause injury, is
sufficiently important to those who purchase and use such
products to justify the court's limiting consideration to toy
guns that achieve realism by shooting hard pellets, then no
reasonable alternative will, by hypothesis, be available. In
that instance, the design feature that defines which alterna-
tives are relevant-the realism of the hard-pellet gun and thus
its capacity to injure-is precisely the feature on which the user
places value and of which the plaintiff complains. If a court
were to adopt this characterization of the product, and deem
the capacity to cause injury an egregiously unacceptable qual-
ity in a toy for use by children, it could conclude that liability
should attach without proof of a reasonable alternative design.
The court would declare the product design to be defective
and not reasonably safe because the extremely high degree of
danger posed by its use or consumption so substantially out-
weighs its negligible social utility that no rational, reasonable
person, fully aware of the relevant facts, would choose to use,
or to allow children to use, the product.
58
E. The Complete Restatement Package on Defective Design
Putting all of the relevant sections dealing with defective de-
sign in a package, the following picture emerges. The Restate-
ment recognizes several non-controversial rules for the
imposition of liability for defective design without the need for
an independent standard for defective design. In each of the fol-
lowing instances, plaintiff need not establish a reasonable alter-
native design to establish a prima facie case:
(1) When the product fails to perform its manifestly intended
function;
(2) When the product fails to comply with a safety statute or
governmental safety regulation;
(3) When the product fails to conform to defendant's specific
misrepresentations about product performance.
In all other cases, described herein as presenting "classic" design
claims, risk-utility principles govern as to whether a product is
defectively designed. In the vast majority of cases, such balanc-
ing requires plaintiff to establish that a reasonable alternative de-
sign could have been adopted and that failure to do so renders
the product not reasonably safe. Some products may be so mani-
58 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 2 cmt. e.
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festly dangerous, in that the risks are so high and the benefits so
low, that a court might conclude that the product is defective
even absent a reasonable alternative design.
II
OVERVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF OREGON LAW
GOVERNING LIABILITY FOR
PRODUCT DESIGN
A. History of Design Liability in Oregon: Adoption of Risk
Utility Balancing
In product design cases involving what are described as "clas-
sic" design claims, Oregon courts apply a risk-utility analysis, re-
quiring the plaintiff to prove that the manufacturer could feasibly
have adopted a reasonable alternative design and that the omis-
sion of such an alternative rendered the defendant's design not
reasonably safe.5 9 In the Heaton decision alluded to earlier and
published more than 30 years ago, the Supreme Court of Oregon
adopted this standard in the context of a claim that a wheel on a
pickup truck was defectively designed in that it disintegrated af-
ter being driven at highway speed over a five-inch rock.' Plain-
tiff argued that the manufacturer had advertised the truck as
"solid" and "rugged," leading the driver reasonably to believe
that it was safe to encounter the rock. The trial court granted
defendant's motion for involuntary nonsuit and the plaintiff ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, asserting that the test for
defect was what reasonable consumers expect in the way of
wheel strength and concluding that the plaintiff had failed to in-
troduce "data concerning the cost or feasibility of designing and
building stronger products."'" The court concluded: "Without
reference to relevant factual data, the jury has no special qualifi-
cations for deciding what is reasonable .... "62 The court also
held that the advertising did not constitute tortious misrepresen-
tation and that "[a] general impression of durability ... does not
help a customer form an expectation about the breaking point of
59 See Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Or. 1978) (holding that
plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence to show that use of fuel injected, as
opposed to carbureted, engine was either practicable or necessary to render airplane
reasonably safe).
60 See supra note 1.
61 Id. at 809.
62 Id.
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a wheel."63
In Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co. ,64 the court continued its
allegiance to risk-utility balancing but opined that whether a
product was reasonably designed was to be determined from the
perspective of a "reasonable manufacturer."65 Subsequently, af-
ter the Oregon legislature had codified § 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, including all of the official comments
thereto,66 the Oregon Supreme Court returned to its original
"consumer expectations" terminology.67
Rejection of the "reasonable manufacturer" test is sound, inas-
much as that perspective might invite a pro-manufacturer bias.
Traditionally, tort law has decided risk-utility cases by asking
whether a reasonable person would have acted in the same man-
ner.68 Thus, the test for design liability under the Products Lia-
bility Restatement is whether the product fails the risk-utility
norms given the perspective of a reasonable person.69 The test
provides a more general societal perspective and not necessarily
that of a manufacturer or a consumer. One is hard pressed to
perceive any substantive difference between the terminology
adopted by the Restatement and the consumer perspective fa-
vored by the Oregon courts. We would urge the Oregon courts
to utilize the reasonable person perspective for two reasons.
First, its congruence with the traditional standard for all cases in
which reasonableness is the issue to be decided would bring Ore-
gon terminology into line with case law throughout the country.
Second, as we have noted earlier, the consumer expectations test
raises the specter of a wholly independent, vague test for defect
that is not consistent with the law of Oregon regarding defective
design. To be sure, Oregon courts have construed the legislative
codification of § 402A and comment i to constitute a commit-
63 Id. at 810.
64 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974); see also Roach v. Kononen, 525 P.2d 125, 128-29 (Or.
1974) (identifying seven factors to be considered when applying reasonable manu-
facturer test).
65 Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1036 ("The test, therefore, is whether the seller would be
negligent if he sold the article knowing of the risk involved.").
66 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.920 (1997).
67 See, e.g., Ewen v. Mclean Trucking Co., 300 Or. 24, 706 P.2d 929 (Or. 1985);
Burns v. General Motors Corp., 133 Or. App. 555, 562-63, 891 P.2d 1354, 1358 (Or.
App. 1995) (holding that trial court should only have charged jury on consumer
expectations and thus erred when it instructed on reasonable seller test).
68 See, e.g., PROSSER ET AL., supra note 38, at 175 ("[N]egligence is a failure to do
what the reasonable person would do 'under the same or similar circumstances."').
69 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 2 cmt. d.
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ment to instructing juries in terms of whether designs disappoint
consumer expectations.7" This is somewhat ironic inasmuch as
Dean Prosser, the reporter responsible for drafting § 402A,
noted, that the consumer expectations test as expressed in com-
ment i was never intended to govern defective design.71 But as
long as the underlying standard for measuring the sufficiency of
plaintiff's proof remains rooted in risk-utility, how juries are in-
structed is of decidedly secondary importance.72
Thus, regardless of the appropriate terminology, Oregon
courts have, over the years, steadfastly required plaintiffs in
"classic" product design cases to prove the availability to the
manufacturer, at the time of sale, of a feasible, safer alternative
design. Moreover, the Oregon high court has made clear that,
consistent with the new Restatment of Products Liability, the
omission of the safer alternative design must render the defend-
ant's product design not reasonably safe, 73 and must have proxi-
mately caused the plaintiff's harm.74
B. Other Grounds In Oregon for Establishing Design Defect
In addition to this risk-utility standard applied in what have
been characterized as "classic" product design claims, Oregon
courts have also recognized the other bases of design liability in-
cluded in the new Restatement and described earlier in this arti-
cle. Thus, Oregon courts impose liability when product designs
fail safely to perform their manifestly intended functions75 and
70 See Ewen, 300 Or. 24, 706 P.2d 929; Burns, 133 Or. App. 555, 891 P.2d 1354.
71 See, e.g., PROSSER, supra note 32, at 644-47 (indicating that the standard for
design defects sounds in classic negligence).
72 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 2 cmt. f ("The necessity of proving
a reasonable alternative design as a predicate for establishing design defect is, like
any factual element in a case, addressed initially to the courts. Sufficient evidence
must be presented so that reasonable persons could conclude that a reasonable al-
ternative could have been practically adopted. Assuming that a court concludes that
sufficient evidence on this issue has been presented, the issue is then for the trier of
fact. This Restatement takes no position regarding the specifics of how a jury should
be instructed.").
73 See, e.g., Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 70-71, 577 P.2d 1322, 1327-
28 (Or. 1978).
74 See, e.g., Austria v. Bike Athletic Co., 107 Or. App. 57, 61, 810 P.2d 1312, 1314
(Or. App. 1991) (holding that failure to adopt alternative design of football helmet
proximately caused injuries to plaintiff).
75 See, e.g., Vanek v. Kirby, 253 Or. 494, 450 P.2d 778 (Or. 1969) (car became
uncontrollable during normal operation on morning it was bought); Brownell v.
White Motor Corp., 260 Or. 251, 490 P.2d 184 (Or. 1971) (wheel separated from axle
of new truck). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 3.
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when product designs fail to conform to applicable safety statutes
or regulations. 76 Furthermore, Oregon courts recognize, at least
in dicta, the legitimacy of imposing liability when products are so
egregiously dangerous that they should not be distributed at all,
even if no safer alternative design was available at the time of
sale.77
C. Representational Theories: Getting It Right and Getting
It Wrong
Oregon, like all other American jurisdictions, recognizes
causes of action for common law misrepresentation 78 and breach
of express warranty. 79 These actions require specific representa-
tions and do not depend on vague references to reasonable con-
sumer expectations.8' Sellers are held to their word. If they
claim or portray a product as being capable of performing safely
in a given manner, they are subject to liability if the product does
not safely perform.
76 While no Oregon court has explicitly held that the failure to conform to a safety
statute or regulation is per se proof of defective design, Oregon has adopted the
more general proposition that such failure constitutes per se negligence. See, e.g.,
Ettinger v. Denny Chancier Equip. Co., 139 Or. App. 103, 107, 910 P.2d 420, 422
(Or. App. 1996). Moreover, several Oregon courts have held that noncompliance
with safety statutes or regulations, even when they on their face do not apply to the
defendant, is highly persuasive evidence of defective design. See, e.g., Hansen v.
Abrasive Eng'g & Mfg., Inc., 317 Or. 378, 387, 856 P.2d 625, 630 (Or. 1993) (holding
that trial court erroneously refused to allow jury to view violation of regulations as
evidence of design defect, even though regulations applied only to employers and
not to defendant manufacturer); Hagan v. Gemstate Mfg., Inc., 148 Or. App. 192,
206-07, 939 P.2d 141, 149 (Or. App. 1997) (holding that trial court erred in failing to
instruct jury more specifically on use of noncompliance with regulation as proof of
design defect, even though regulation applied only to employers and not to defend-
ant manufacturer). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 4.
77 See, e.g., Wilson, 282 Or. at 71 n.5, 577 P.2d at 1329 n.5 (1978) ("If, for exam-
ple, the danger was relatively severe and the product had only limited utility, the
court might properly conclude that the jury could find that a reasonable manufac-
turer would not have introduced such a product into the stream of commerce.").
78 See, e.g., Webb v. Clark, 274 Or. 387, 391, 546 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Or. 1976); Rice
v. McAllister, 268 Or. 125, 128, 519 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Or. 1974); Conzelmann v.
Northwest Poultry & Dairy Prods. Co., 190 Or. 332, 225 P.2d 757 (Or. 1950).79 See OR. REV. STAT. § 72.3130. See also, e.g., Western Feed Co. v. Heidloff, 230
Or. 324, 370 P.2d 612 (Or. 1962); Sol-o-lite Laminating Corp. v. Allen, 223 Or. 80,
353 P.2d 843 (Or. 1960).
80 See, e.g., Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 475, 435 P.2d 806, 810 (Or.
1967) ("The plaintiff does not contend that the advertising constituted misrepresen-
tation under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402B, but rather that the advertising
in general tends to create expectations of strength and durability under Section
402A. A general impression of durability, however, does not help a customer to
form an expectation about the breaking point of a wheel.").
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It is at this juncture that the recent McCathern8 1 case provides
cause for concern. McCathern recognizes two approaches to de-
termining whether consumer expectations have been disap-
pointed: the traditional risk-utility approach discussed earlier and
what it describes as a "representational approach." Regarding
the recognition in McCathern of the representational approach
to product design liability, we have no particular quarrel with it
to the extent that Oregon courts require plaintiffs to establish the
formal elements of either tortious misrepresentation or breach of
express warranty. Portions of the court's discussion suggest that
the defendant's advertising and marketing must be sufficiently
specific to satisfy the traditional requirements of tortious misrep-
resentation.82 The new Restatement recognizes this basis of
product sellers' liability, albeit not as part of the definition of
"defect. 83
To the extent, however, that McCathern may be read to con-
done the imposition of liability based on heightened consumer
expectations flowing out of vague, generalized assertions of qual-
ity and safety in product advertising, we most strongly urge the
Oregon high court to reject such a position. Some portions of
the opinion suggest that the Court of Appeals in McCathern is,
indeed, advocating a vague consumer expectations test.84 In any
event, the court explains that, in connection with the representa-
tional approach to consumer expectations, the plaintiff need not
prove that a safer design was feasible or practicable,85 nor must
the plaintiff prove but-for causation.86
The reasons for urging the Oregon Supreme Court to reject a
vague consumer expectations test based on product representa-
tions are many. First, there is no authority in Oregon to support
a pure consumer expectations test. As noted earlier, the
81 McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., 160 Or. App. 201 (1999).
82 Id. at 209 ("[P]roduct defect is established by proving that the manufacturer
specifically represented to the consuming public that the product would be able to
perform certain functions, when, in fact, it could not, resulting in the plaintiff's
injury.").
83 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 9 (misrepresentation); id. § 9 cmt.
e (express warranty).
84 McCathern, 160 Or. App. at 209 ("The commercial advertising of a product will
be the guiding force upon the expectations of consumers with regard to the safety of
a product, and is highly relevant to a formulation of what those expectations might
be.") (quoting Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568, 578 (Ohio
1981)).
85 Id. at 210.
86 Id.
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landmark Heaton case made it clear that general consumer ex-
pectations resulting from vague impressions in advertisements
that do not rise to the level of specific misrepresentations do not
suffice to establish a case for design defect.87 Second, for the
host of policy reasons set forth in Section II of this article, a
vague impressionistic consumer expectation test is both unfair
and judicially unmanageable.88 Third, such a potentially mischie-
vous approach is unnecessary. When product sellers create
vague impressions of safety through advertising and do not alert
consumers to product-related risks, they are subject to a classic
failure to warn action.89 Whether a warning is adequate in any
given case must take into account the general impressions that
consumers harbor with regard to how products will function. 9°
Fourth, many of the cases that the McCathern court cites as sup-
porting the consumer expectations test do not support its use in
classic design cases.9' Fifth, there is no legislative mandate in Or-
87 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
88 See supra Part II.C.
89 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 2(c).
90 Id. § 2 cmt. i.
91 The McCathern opinion asserts that "roughly a dozen" jurisdictions have
adopted a consumer expectations standard for defective design. McCathern v.
Toyota Motor Corp., 160 Or. App. 201, 208 n.5 (1999), and accompanying text. The
court cites eleven cases in support of this assertion. Of these, arguably only four
really support the assertion. French v. Grove Mfg. Co., 656 F.2d 295, 298 (8th Cir.
1981) (applying Arkansas law) ("'Unreasonably dangerous' means that a product is
dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
and reasonable buyer, consumer or user .... [There is] no requirement that a feasi-
ble and safer alternative be proven by the plaintiff .. "); General Motors Corp. v.
Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1220 (Alaska 1998) ("[T]he factfinder can find a product
defective ... if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform as safely
as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably fore-
seeable manner."); Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 659 P.2d 734, 739 (Haw.
1983) ("[Tlhe plaintiff need not show that the article was dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases
or uses it. It is enough that the plaintiff demonstrates that because of its manufac-
ture or design, the product does not meet the reasonable expectations of the ordi-
nary consumer or user as to its safety." (footnote and citation omitted)); Kudlacek v.
Fiat, 509 N.W.2d 603, 610 (Neb. 1994) ("'Unreasonably dangerous' means that the
product has a propensity for causing physical harm beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary user or consumer who purchases it .... ). As for the
others, two measure consumer expectations by a risk-utility standard. Aller v. Rod-
gers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 835 (Iowa 1978) ("Proof of unreasonableness
involves a balancing process. On one side of the scale is the utility of the product
and on the other is the risk of its use."); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 542 P.2d
774, 779 (Wash. 1975) (" 'The relative cost of the product, the gravity of the potential
harm ... and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or minimizing the risk may be
relevant' [to the issue of defective design]."). One decision involved a res ipsa-type
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egon for adopting the consumer expectations test as an in-
dependent test for defect in a classic design case. Whatever may
be said for the proposition that the legislature may have ex-
pressed preference for a terminological consumer risk-utility test
in framing jury instructions, there is nothing to be said for the
proposition that it mandated a wholly independent consumer ex-
pectations test for defective design. 92 As noted earlier, § 402A,
comment i need not be read as imposing such a general standard
for design defect liability.93 Dean Prosser's commentary emphat-
ically rejects such a reading and his view has been confirmed by
other scholars.94
case for which a standard for defect was unnecessary. Queen City Terminals, Inc. v.
General Am. Transp. Corp., 653 N.E.2d 661 (Ohio 1995) (railway cars designed to
transport hazardous chemicals leaked); cf. supra note 72 and accompanying text.
Three jurisdictions involved cases in which a safer alternative design was proven and
thus the talk of consumer expectations constituted dicta. Potter v. Chicago Pneu-
matic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997); Lee v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 688
P.2d 1283 (Okla. 1984); Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 360 N.W.2d 2
(Wis. 1984). The Connecticut decision is explained in Achieving Consensus, supra
note 7, at 908-11. The Oklahoma decision may have involved a res ipsa situation, in
which case a design standard would not have been required. Cf. supra note 72 and
accompanying text. And one decision cited in the McCathern opinion involved the
court clearly invoking a no-duty rule that abrogated liability regardless of the stan-
dard for design defect. Lamkin v. Towner, 563 N.E.2d 449, 457 (Ill. 1990) ("[a]
screen in a window, obviously and of common knowledge, is not placed there for the
purpose of keeping persons from falling out of a window." (quoting Crawford v.
Orner & Shayne, Inc., 73 N.E.2d 615, 617 (Ill. App. Ct. 1947)). The authors compre-
hensively explain the various ways in which courts and commentators have mis-
characterized decisions as involving consumer expectations in Achieving Consensus,
supra note 7, at 888-93. As explained earlier, the case law and statutory authority
requiring courts to engage in risk-utility balancing in design cases is overwhelming.
See supra note 31, and accompanying text.
92 Although there is limited authority suggesting that the Oregon legislature in-
tended for courts to decide design defect cases based on a consumer expectations
test, see, e.g., Burns v. General Motors Corp., 133 Or. App. 555, 560, 891 P.2d 1354,
1357 (1995), such decisions are typically based upon legislative history. See, e.g., id.
However, legislative history, while persuasive, is not controlling. See, e.g., Henthorn
v. Grand Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 14, Linn County, 287 Or. 683, 691, 601 P.2d 1243,
1248 n.5 (1979). A leading commentator on Oregon products liability law, writing
shortly after enactment of the statute, argued that § 402A was primarily drafted to
address cases of manufacturing defect. Dominick Vetri, Legislative Codification of
Strict Products Liability Law in Oregon, 59 OR. L. REV. 363, 366 (1981). In fact,
Professor Vetri observed that "[t]he complex design defect and inadequate warning
cases which present the hard policy choices and difficult legal issues today were still
on the horizon." Id.
93 See supra note 69.
94 PROSSER, supra note 32, at 644-47 (indicating that the standard for design de-
fects sounds in classic negligence). See also Achieving Consensus, supra note 7, at
880 ("The simple truth is that liability for defective design was in its nascent stages
in the early 1960s and section 402A did not address it meaningfully, if at all.");
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CONCLUSION
Oregon courts have traditionally adopted a test for defect in
classic design cases that, in substance, is perfectly congruent with
§ 2(b) of the new Restatement of Products Liability; risk utility
balancing with the requirement that the plaintiff prove that a rea-
sonable, safer alternative was available at the time of sale that
would have reduced or eliminated plaintiff's harm. Oregon
courts recently returned to "consumer expectations" terminology
in such cases, apparently out of dissatisfaction with "reasonable
manufacturer" terminology employed during a 20-year interim.
The new Restatement offers a middle-ground-"reasonable per-
son" terminology-that the authors, who were co-reporters on
the Restatement project, urge the Oregon Supreme Court to
adopt. Substantively, however, until quite recently, the Oregon
courts had design defect liability "right."
The event earlier this year that gives rise to concern is the pub-
lication of the Court of Appeals decision in McCathern v. Toyota
Motor Corp.95 In the McCathern opinion, the court appears to
embrace vague "reasonable expectations" as a substantive-not
merely terminological-alternative to risk-utility balancing via
what it refers to as an independent "representational approach."
Read in its worst light, the decision recognizes the disappoint-
ment of expectations, heightened through vague assertions in
product advertising and marketing, as an independent basis of
design liability. No prior holdings by Oregon courts support such
an essentially lawless approach to classic design litigation.
Neither comment i to § 402A nor the Oregon statute codifying
§ 402A support it; and the new Restatement emphatically rejects
it. If Oregon courts are to maintain the integrity of their prod-
ucts liability law and to retain its well-deserved position of emi-
nence, the Supreme Court of Oregon must also reject this
misapplication of the concept of consumer expectations.
George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARDOZO L. REV.
2301 passim (1989).
95 160 Or. App. 201 (1999).
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